In this article, we will survey and analyze proposed solutions to the Israel-Palestine problem, as well as revisit and refine my article from two years ago which claimed to identify the only viable solution.
The Two-State Solution
Many hail the Two-State Solution as the venerable and only practical solution to the problem, though calling it venerable, or even decrepit, is extremely charitable.
To start with, this plan has been tried at least nine times and has failed miserably every time. Here is a list of the most prominent and concrete attempts at implementing this solution, excluding dozens of similar proposals that never reached the negotiating table:
The 1937 Peel Commission partition plan under the British Mandate: This plan promised 75-80% of the land to Arabs in addition to the larger territory already given to Transjordan. The Jews, after some bitter internal debate, accepted it. The Arabs rejected it, and in response, continued their violent revolt against the British until 1939.
The most well-known two-state partition plan was assembled by the UN in 1947 (Resolution 181). Once again, this plan was accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs. This rejection was pivotal in providing Israel with a legal sovereign claim to all of the territory. In response, the Arabs launched two wars: an internal war against Israel in 1947 and a broader regional invasion in 1948, followed by decades of continued attacks after 1950.
By far the most neglected and underappreciated two-state solution was the Allon Plan in 1967 immediately following Israel's victory during the Six-Day War. The plan involved giving away territory taken from Jordan, Syria and Egypt in return for peace. It offered two possibilities: To either give the land to Jordan in exchange for peace, or—the Israeli preferred option—to establish an autonomous Palestinian entity in the West Bank. Proponents of the theory of Israeli expansionism conveniently ignore this Israeli offer, which clearly demonstrates where Israel's real priorities lay even after conquering all of the land in 1967. Both Palestinians and Jordan rejected it, and Arab states continued hostilities with the War of Attrition (1967–70) and the Yom Kippur War (1973) despite the offer.
Another neglected and forgotten plan with an offer for Palestinian governance was proposed by none other than the right-wing Menachem Begin in 1982. It was inspired by the then-recent peace agreement with Egypt (under which Begin returned Sinai to Egypt and uprooted settlements there in return for peace). Unlike Egypt, the Palestinians rejected the deal. In response, they resumed attacks against Israel from Lebanon, leading to the 1982 war, and launched the First Intifada in 1987.
Strictly speaking, the Oslo Accords (1993-) were not a finalized partition plan but a framework for one, within which several proposals for final partition plans would be made. However, within this framework, Israel granted the PLO administrative control over parts of the West Bank and withdrew from several areas and settlements over the years. This framework was accepted by the PLO, and yet, in blatant contradiction, the Palestinians responded with hundreds of horrendous terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s even while negotiations were ongoing.
The first attempt to finalize the Oslo process with a partition plan took place in 2000 (the Camp David Summit). It was mediated by President Clinton between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat. Israel accepted it; the Palestinians rejected it and responded with the Second Intifada.
The Road Map for Peace in 2003-2005 was negotiated by President Bush between Sharon and Arafat/Abbas. Inspired by the Oslo Accords, it focused primarily on phased trust-building steps, this time crafted to lead to a final agreement by 2005. Both Jews and Arabs accepted it. However, the process collapsed amid the relentless violence of the Second Intifada, which made further Israeli withdrawals impossible.
The ultimate proposal and attempt to finalize the Oslo Accords was made by Ehud Olmert in 2007. In this proposal, Olmert fulfilled nearly all Palestinian demands except for a full Right of Return. The Palestinians rejected the plan and responded with attacks from Gaza (from which Israel had recently withdrawn in 2005), launching a new series of Gaza wars.
In 2020, Trump attempted a less generous but more pragmatic partition plan nicknamed The Deal of the Century. The Palestinians rejected the plan outright.
This clearly demonstrates that not only did all nine attempts fail miserably, in many cases they actually made things worse. Terrorism and attacks against Israel often increased immediately after or even during negotiations. This is by design: Hamas and other Palestinian factions have long adopted the policy that negotiating with Israel is not only forbidden, but must be resisted with force. Arguing that this is only an extremist position does not hold water, since most Palestinian civilians consistently support terrorist groups in polls, and the PLO openly rewards terrorists and their families and teaches violence in schools. Thus, not only are they far from fighting extremists—except for show—they actually encourage and support them.
In addition, any land handed to the Palestinians is quickly seized and weaponized by terrorists to attack Israel. This happened repeatedly in Gaza, the West Bank during Oslo, and twice in Lebanon. The Oslo accords are seen by many Israelis as a catastrophic mistake, since they allowed the PLO to return to Israel after being driven out of Jordan and Lebanon and exiled to Tunisia where they could do no harm.
Since withdrawals and peace plans have only exacerbated violence, it should be no surprise that a majority of Israelis are deeply disillusioned with peace plans, not because they oppose peace or a Palestinian state, but because they are tired of being killed for their efforts. Contrary to the popular claim that opposition comes only from Israel’s right-wing, resistance to new partition plans has become bipartisan, with a majority of Israelis consistently voting against a Palestinian state. Support for such a state drops further after each new wave of terrorist attacks. But, again, it must be emphasized that this is not because most Israelis are against a Palestinian state and we proved this with polls in a previous article.
Increased violence and weaponized territory are not the only problems: Any established Palestinian state could easily and quickly become a Hamas or ISIS-style state, not just through a violent coup, but even via legal elections. This scenario actually occurred in Gaza in 2005 after Israel handed the whole of Gaza to Palestinians on a silver platter, after which they promptly elected Hamas into power.
It is said, "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me". It is also said, "the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." What, then, could be said about a world determined to repeat the same catastrophic mistake a tenth time, expecting different results? What kind of madman repeats the same mistake for ninety years?
Despite all this, we have not yet stated the most compelling reason to disqualify the two-state solution. Most of the world doesn't care what Israelis think. In addition, madmen can indeed convince themselves that they will somehow succeed where others have failed for ninety years. But the most fatal flaw—the reason this idea is not merely wrong but absurd—is that even the Palestinians themselves do not want the Two-State Solution:
Palestinian civilians: In polls, when asked whether they support: 1. The one-state solution 2. The two-state solution 3. "A Palestinian state from the river to the sea", 75% of them chose option #3. (That's in addition to roughly 90% expressing support for terrorist groups.)
Jihadists: Hamas has stated explicitly—and enshrined this in both their charters—that Israel must be destroyed. Furthermore, they forbid any and all agreements with Israel that undermine their cause of destroying Israel.
The PLO: Although the PLO signed the Oslo Accords, agreed to a Two-State Solution, and officially recognized Israel in Western forums, this is both deceptive and meaningless. It is deceptive because even the PLO does not accept the Two-State Solution as a solution, but as a stepping stone. They have declared so explicitly and officially in 1974, and have reaffirmed that position repeatedly even after Oslo, often invoking the al-Hudaybiya agreement as their model. Furthermore, despite their promise to amend their charter which calls for Israel’s destruction, they have never actually done so. Even if all this fails to convince and their stated intentions are taken at face value, this is still meaningless because the PLO today represents only 15–25% of Palestinians in polls. Their position, therefore, does not represent Palestinian opinion.
One interesting counter-argument to the 'stepping stone' or Trojan horse claim is that if the PLO had truly intended to weaponize statehood, it would have accepted the best offer it could negotiate rather than rejected so many. That argument doesn't hold water, however, because even a Trojan horse requires certain core conditions to succeed. For instance, if the soldiers inside can't smuggle in their weapons—say, by lacking control over the border with Jordan—then the plan is unworkable and would naturally be rejected. More importantly, if the plan were to conquer Israel through the Right of Return, then any offer that excluded that demand would be rejected as well. And indeed, both Arafat and Abbas explicitly stated that very reason for rejecting the offers.
In summary, the classic Two-State Solution has not only been attempted nine times and failed disastrously nine times, it is supported by neither side of the conflict, and yet the world still trots it out whenever the topic is raised. This is beyond kicking a dead horse: The horse has long rotted away, reduced to a skeleton, and yet world leaders keep digging up the skeleton, saddling it, and harnessing it to haul their political agenda.
One-State Solution Variants
One problem with the term 'One-State Solution' is that it serves as an umbrella for several fundamentally different solutions with drastically different outcomes. These variants are often conflated when the term is used without qualification, creating a great deal of confusion.
The key issue to keep in mind when evaluating these solutions is the demographic one: Israel currently includes over 7 million Jews and 2 million Arabs. Beyond that, there are roughly 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank, another 2 million in Gaza, and between 5 to 9 million so-called Palestinian 'refugees' outside the region who demand a 'Right of Return'. This yields a potential total of 12 to 16 million Arabs within the region.
The Democratic One-State AKA The Palestinian State
When Arabs, Muslims and pro-Palestinians activists around the world speak of a One-State Solution, they generally mean a simple democratic model where every person gets one vote and the government rules by majority. Furthermore, they insist on the Right of Return. Given that this means an immediate Arab majority, it would be naive to imagine that laws wouldn't be reshaped to allow Palestinian culture and demands to dominate.
The outcome of this model is obvious: At best, this means the end of the Jewish state with a 2-to-1 Arab majority. It means yet another new Arab/Muslim state to join the existing 22 Arab and 50-plus Muslim states around the world, leaving none that are Jewish, with no home that Jews can call their own. It would almost certainly bring renewed waves of anti-Jewish violence and pogroms, with no IDF left to defend Jewish civilians. This is the best-case scenario. Given the barbaric behavior of many Gazan citizens during the October 7 attack when they joined Hamas to rape and murder families, the worst-case outcome is a second Holocaust. Palestinians on the street have repeatedly stated openly that, if and when they get their state, Jews will not be allowed to stay.
This so-called 'solution' is a nonstarter. When and if Arabs support it, they are fully aware of what they are endorsing. As for the few leftist Israelis who back this scenario, the only plausible explanation is suicidal recklessness born of extreme naivety.
The Israeli One-State
Unlike the previous variant, a minority of sane but impractical Israelis that support the One-State Solution generally envision a variant model where Palestinians are restricted in some way, allowing the state to maintain its primarily Jewish character.
The most common proposed variant is one in which only the West Bank becomes part of Israel, resulting in 7 million Jews and 5+ million Arabs. Thus non-belligerent Arabs would receive full voting rights, but would not constitute a majority. In other words, the state's character would remain largely the same as present-day Israel, albeit with a significantly larger Arab minority.
Even this seemingly practical solution faces multiple problems: It ignores the Gaza issue. It does not solve the Judea & Samaria (AKA West Bank) security problem. Keep in mind Israel has had military control of the territory since 1967 without achieving peace. To assume Palestinians would magically become peaceful when they get citizenship is naive. Yet another problem is that it doesn't explain what happens to Palestinians that do not wish to become Israeli citizens. It also doesn't address inevitable future demographic changes. And, finally, it doesn't address problems with forming Israeli-friendly coalitions in the government, given that over 40% of votes would come from Arabs.
It almost doesn't matter what percentage of the Arab population would be hostile to Israel after such changes. Even if only 5% were extremist terrorists, the situation could continue much as it has over the past 70 years. Advocates of these solutions overlook the key reason Ariel Sharon disengaged from Gaza: the high cost of controlling, patrolling, and policing hostile territories, and of protecting Jewish civilians—both in terms of lives and money.
Some variants propose giving Arabs more or less autonomy in their regions, but the core problems remain.
Other variations of the Israel single-state solution range from impractical to outright unworkable:
Any variation that strips Arab voting rights would constitute an apartheid state, with all the extreme political isolation and pressure that would ensue from such a move. Occupation without voting rights is legal; sovereignty without voting rights is a very different matter.
Some have suggested a model akin to Puerto Rico where residents cannot vote federally. Even in that case, Puerto Ricans can move into the U.S. proper and vote, but Arabs in the West Bank could not move into Israel for obvious reasons, making the analogy fundamentally flawed.
Any model that includes Gaza would create an instant Arab majority (see 'Democratic One-State' above). On the other hand, excluding Gaza leaves the problem unresolved.
Frankly, many of the Israelis who support these variants are extreme right-wing settlers that are so obsessed with settling more land, they overlook the glaring impracticalities of their proposals.
The Shared One-State
This final variant of the One-State Solution is less popular but more intriguing: It involves various models that guarantee shared governance and protect freedoms for its diverse constituents. The most interesting feature of this approach is a theoretical mechanism that could potentially ensure balanced governance regardless of election outcomes or demographic shifts, by embedding power-sharing provisions directly into the constitution. In other words, it could secure basic rights and equal representation even for groups that are minorities.
One obvious real-world example of this model is both revealing and discouraging: Lebanon has employed a sectarian power-sharing system since 1943, guaranteeing shared governance and political representation for its Shiite, Sunni and Christian population. Unfortunately, it also vividly illustrates the deep flaws of such a system. One only has to look at the extreme instability of that country, its many wars, fierce factional disputes, prolonged political deadlock, and collapsing economy. If this extreme dysfunction occurs in a society that is nearly 100% Arab, one can only imagine the catastrophic results of attempting a similar shared governance model in a mixed Jewish-Arab state.
One often overlooked historical fact is that, of all the One-State Solution variants we've presented, this model was the only one that was formally placed on the negotiating table and presented to both sides. This occurred in 1939 under the British mandate as part of the White Paper, following the Arab rejection of the Two-State Solution proposed by the Peel Commission and towards the end of the Arab revolt of 1936-9. Unfortunately, in addition to the challenges of this model mentioned in the previous paragraph, the White Paper also included many contentious clauses that restricted Jewish immigration and land purchases in an attempt to placate the angry Arabs. It also included a degree of British control to guarantee functional governance. Unsurprisingly it was rejected by the Jewish leadership. Surprisingly, it was also rejected by the Arab leaders. After this failure, the British would gradually give up on the whole issue and hand it over to the UN in 1947.
The Emirates Plan AKA The Eight-State Solution
This unique solution is intriguing and exciting, if only because it is creative, informed and very different from the tired, failed solutions that have been discussed ad nauseam for the past ninety years. However, it does require adopting a different mindset and understanding the Arab way of thinking. As such, it raises its own set of questions and uncertainties for people like myself who have not studied that mindset, although it does sound plausible and practical.
This plan originated with Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a man who became fluent in Arabic in his youth, served 25 years in IDF military intelligence specializing in Islamic groups, and later spent decades in academia as an expert Arabist. We will soon present a summary of his proposal, but it can be heard directly from him in the following videos: This one offers the best comprehensive presentation I could find, including answers to several key questions. This one is a shorter executive summary. This video offers an alternate take with additional points of interest.
His plan rests on two key foundations:
Homogeneity and tribal rule lead to stability: Throughout the Arab world, states have only functioned and remained stable when they were homogeneous and ruled by a single family, clan, or tribe. Stability matters, because chaos inevitably breeds terrorist factions. Compare Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar with Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon, where multiple sects and ethnicities have struggled for dominance.
Clan priorities override national, ideological or religious goals. This is the critical foundation. When Arab states are clan-based, the ruling family's agenda—whatever it may be—takes precedence even over Islamic or nationalist causes. Anyone within their territory who does not conform is tightly controlled, exiled, or eliminated. This is why, for example, the UAE recently had no hesitation in arresting and punishing Muslim extremists who attacked a Jew in a high-profile case. Clans do not allow groups such as ISIS or the Muslim Brotherhood to take root in their kingdoms, as such groups threaten their authority and stability.
Given these two foundations, the solution envisions establishing at least eight emirate-style island mini-states within Israel, one for each major region or city where a single clan has historically dominated. The term 'Eight-State Solution' is somewhat misleading, since it covers only the West Bank; Gaza would require the creation (or re-establishment) of roughly five additional emirates to replace and dismantle Hamas’s control.
These emirates would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, with details to be negotiated individually. They would function as separate, sovereign entities with their own internal security forces responsible for maintaining order within their territories.
A critical restriction, emphasized by Dr. Kedar, is that no emirate should have contiguous land borders with another. Contiguity, he argues, would lead to tribal conflict and instability, creating openings for terrorist factions to emerge. However, the emirates could form federations if they chose, and Israel could facilitate travel between them.
Israel would maintain full sovereignty over the land between these emirates, incorporating any scattered Arab populations in those areas as Israeli citizens, unless they chose to relocate into an emirate. Arabs living in the emirates would hold citizenship and ID cards issued by their own emirate, with the potential option of holding a secondary Israeli ID, subject to future negotiations.
My questions and skepticism concerning this plan are as follows:
If clans are still dominant in the West Bank, how did the PLO manage to take over? Also, why don't these clans clamp down on the many terrorists operating within their territories—terrorists whose actions force the IDF to repeatedly raid and damage property and lives there? Presumably, this happened because the clans were stripped of their power, money, and security forces. In other words, the PLO and Hamas have suppressed traditional clan authority with their control and infrastructure, and the clan's power is merely dormant. But this seems slightly uncertain and requires taking a risk.
What happens if one of the dominant clans refuses to recognize Israel or is outright hostile to it? Presumably, it would be impossible to replace them. Are all clan leaders friendly to Israel? It didn't seem so back in 1947.
In fact, 1947 seems to disprove Kedar's theory altogether, since the PLO and Hamas did not exist then, unless the clans have since changed their minds.
What about the expelled or scattered hardline terrorists and ideological militants who refuse to abandon their cause? It's difficult to believe that thousands of lifelong jihadists, steeped in decades of Islamist indoctrination, would simply realign themselves under a clan leadership that cooperates with Israel. Kedar explained that the terrorists in their territories would be controlled or killed, but I am referring to the ones that are expelled or that live between the emirates.
Is the current chaos in Gaza truly fixable by this model? Can the clans be re-established despite widespread indoctrination by Hamas?
What if Hamas overthrows one of the emirates, throwing its leaders off rooftops, just as they did with the PLO? Wouldn’t that simply return us to square one?
In summary, this is a fascinating proposed solution, but one riddled with several major question marks. Still, it's definitely an idea worth exploring by leaders and policymakers, perhaps through a limited pilot project with a single emirate to test the concept in practice.
Trump's "Riviera Plan" for Gaza
This plan refers to Donald Trump's 2025 idea of encouraging and enabling all Gazans to leave Gaza, allowing the U.S. to convert Gaza into some kind of U.S.-controlled real-estate project. Obviously, this plan is largely tangential to the main topic of this article, as it was meant to address the Gaza war specifically, not the broader Israel-Palestine problem. However, as a corollary, it included a partial solution for the latter problem as well, and in a very creative and unique way, which is why many people were excited about the idea.
We will set aside discussions of the plan's legal aspects, logistical challenges, debates about whether the proposed emigration was intended to be voluntary and how the media may have distorted Trump’s words or intentions. Those issues are outside the scope of this article. I include this plan only to raise one intriguing question: Would the mass emigration of Palestinians actually solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem?
At first glance, it seems obvious that if there are no Palestinians in the area, the problem simply vanishes. But that assumption collapses under scrutiny.
The first relevant question is whether Palestinians would be allowed to return once Gaza is rebuilt. If the answer is yes, then, obviously, the problem isn't solved, only postponed.
An overlooked, deeper and more serious concern, however, is the question of where the Palestinians would emigrate to. Their destination is critical, as it could make things worse than they were. The worst-case scenario would be large-scale relocation to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, directly on Israel’s southern border. It's worth remembering that for decades, Egyptian smugglers funneled weapons and goods into Gaza through Sinai. If Palestinians were to settle there, smuggling would become even easier. The worst aspect of this outcome however, is that it would provide terrorists with an even larger border with Israel than they had while in Gaza, effectively giving militants more opportunities for attacks.
Even if Egypt initially promised to control such activity, it could later claim that it had 'lost control' of Sinai, creating a situation similar to Lebanon, where Hezbollah took military control of the border region with Israel. This expanded border would also make Israel’s position far more complicated politically and diplomatically, since it would now have to strike within the territory of a sovereign state to defend itself.
Other potential destinations, such as Lebanon or Jordan, pose similar risks. Lebanon could once again slide into chaos reminiscent of the 1982 war, while Jordan’s fragile balance could be destabilized. The only feasible solution of this kind would involve relocation to a country not sharing a border with Israel, as when the PLO was exiled to Tunisia between 1982 and 1993, during which time Israel experienced a notable reduction in border terrorism.
The Deradicalization Plan (AKA The Precondition Plan)
This brings us back to the 2003 article mentioned in the introduction where I presented what seemed to be the only viable plan. First, a summary of the article:
The article began by first defining the exact cause of the problem: For a hundred years, the majority of Palestinian civilians—not a minority of extremists—have refused, and continue to refuse, to accept Israel as their neighbor. The extremists are the majority, not the minority. The article backed this claim with hard evidence. This simple but glaring truth explains why every peace initiative has failed to date. The problems and failures persist until today because most people refuse to acknowledge this reality.
Defining and accepting the actual problem is obviously critical to finding a viable solution. Without a definition, all solutions are little more than fantasies that 'solve' a non-existent reality.
If we were trying to reconcile a divorced couple, we would start with the assumption that, at least deep down, some part of them wants to get back together. If this desire were missing, all solutions would never get off the ground, no matter how well thought out they may be. But the opposite is also true: If the will exists, many solutions could work. Where there's a will there's a way. And if the will is missing, then we must create that will, otherwise all efforts will be for naught.
Which is why, once this problem is clearly defined, the only viable solution essentially writes itself: A deradicalization project must be implemented, no matter how long it takes and how many setbacks it faces. Any proposed solution must be preconditioned on the success of such a deradicalization project. Deradicalization is not a 'nice-to-have' side-project or an afterthought while working on a solution, it is the fundamental key to make any plan work, and no solution can be initiated before its completion.
The article outlined several potential implementation strategies. To these we could add that foolproof goals and indicators must be clearly defined. For example, undercover monitors could visit random schools and mosques to record lectures. When antisemitism ceases to exist in these locations for a certain period of time, a milestone has been reached. Perhaps another indicator could be a set percentage of citizens that openly declare their support for the state of Israel in public without fear of repercussions. Other similar measurable milestones could be established.
A critical feature of this plan is that it accounts for failure. In other words, the preconditioned approach ensures that no high-risk state-forming initiative is attempted before the conditions are right. This makes it an easy sell to the Israeli public and to moderate right-wing governments. The article also strongly recommended involving international deradicalization organizations so that the global community can witness the radicalization firsthand. It should be set up so that if it fails, the failure will be international.
Furthermore, the world would then be working on a fresh, genuinely different project—one with a realistic chance of success—rather than endlessly repeating the same failed approach for the tenth time and expecting a different outcome.
As for arguments against this plan, imagine the following exchange:
Pro-Palestine: Your plan is a deception designed to cancel the Palestinian state while pretending to implement it. It sets impossible preconditions that could be invoked at any time to deny Palestinians their goal and to suppress, control and colonize them with foreign entities.
Pro-Israel: Are you saying that asking Palestinians to accept Israel is an impossible goal and that it will never happen in our lifetime? If that's the case, how can you reasonably demand a two-state solution? If Palestinians genuinely want to live side by side with Israel, the deradicalization phase will be completed in no time.
Note that if and when deradicalization is successful, several of the aforementioned failed solutions could actually work. The article hinted that this would be a precondition for some variant of a two-state solution, but the truth is it could work as a precondition for one of the practical one-state solutions as well.
World leaders who have staked their reputation on the Two-State Solution could still frame this approach as an extended version, or name it the 'Preconditioned Two-State Solution', and save face that way.
Having learned of the 'Emirates Plan' after I wrote the article, I must admit it also has the potential to be viable. However, it carries many question marks and significant risks, whereas the Deradicalization Plan greatly reduces—or even eliminates—those risks. On the other hand, the Deradicalization Plan also has significant chances of (risk-free) failure and will take longer. Alternatively, even the Emirates Plan could benefit from a deradicalization precondition, which would help mitigate some of the risks and challenges I highlighted earlier.
Trump's 20-Point Plan
We conclude with a few brief remarks on the current peace plan President Trump is attempting to implement. As with the earlier 'Riviera Plan', its primary goal is to end the Gaza war and solve the Gaza problem, not to address the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Still, it includes a brief mention of a potential final peace framework with which he gained acceptance for the plan from Arab states. In addition, as with the Oslo Accords, it deferred the final details, deliberately leaving the stages ambiguous and open to interpretation. Because of these facts, this plan has only limited relevance to our discussion.
Over the past years, various political leaders have mentioned deradicalization in passing, but it has never been formalized or systematically integrated into any peace initiative, until now. This new 20-Point Plan is somewhat novel and encouraging in that it explicitly incorporates deradicalization as part of the overall framework, and even secured the signatures of several Arab states endorsing such a clause.
Specifically, the first clause states: "Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors". Clause 16 adds: "An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values
of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and
narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that
can be derived from peace". Qatar, Egypt and Turkey, however, signed a different document in Sharm el-Sheikh which states: "We are united in our determination to dismantle extremism and radicalization in all its forms. No society can flourish when violence and racism is normalized, or when radical ideologies threaten the fabric of civil life. We commit to addressing the conditions that enable extremism and to promoting education, opportunity, and mutual respect as foundations for lasting peace.".
However, the plan does not define when deradicalization will occur, at which stage, and whether any other steps are dependent on its success. The wording—particularly the phrase 'to try'—is far from assertive. Nor does the plan specify who will oversee implementation or what concrete milestones must be met. Because of this vagueness, future administrators could interpret the deradicalization process either as a mandatory preliminary phase or merely as an aspirational principle, and nothing in the document guarantees which interpretation will prevail.
Therefore, the world has taken one small step closer toward the Deradicalization Plan, yet, we are still far from truly adopting it as the foundation of any lasting peace. Setting preconditions is the key.
In conclusion: Many solutions are viable in theory, but only if conditions are right. The Deradicalization Plan remains the only real path forward, the only way to make any solution truly work. Trump's plan is ambiguous enough to allow for this, but this interpretation and outcome are not guaranteed. Peace will only be within reach when the world finally faces reality for what it is. Instead, most world leaders choose to ignore reality and reward radicalization with 'solutions' that only strengthen the extremists.