In a pluralistic world, the separation of religion and state sounds elegant in theory but often breaks down in practice. A clear example is the long-running, widely misunderstood, and deeply contentious issue of military conscription for Orthodox ("Haredi") Jews in Israel.
Although this is an internal Israeli political issue and often treated as niche by outside analysts, it serves as a sharp case study in the weaknesses and tensions built into this political philosophy. In addition, it illustrates the widening fault lines between modern political camps that increasingly operate in separate realities, with the gap hardening year by year. This particular chasm of Israeli conscription dates back to Israel's founding in 1948; legal and political battles over the issue have continued almost nonstop ever since, growing more charged and more polarizing over time. The vast majority of news articles either only mention this topic in
passing, or greatly misrepresent the real underlying issues and
arguments. In this article, we will summarize and clarify the history, the arguments, describe the gap and explain why it has been unbridgeable so far, as well as uncover the real motivations behind the clash.
A note on the term "ultra-Orthodox": Since there is no group formally known as simply "Orthodox", the label is basically inflated and rhetorically loaded, suggesting extremism, similar to how "far-right" is often used today by the left as a blanket tag for all conservatives. The Haredi are merely religious Jews continuing a 4000-year-old religion and tradition, as opposed to the more modern offshoots such as Modern Orthodox and Religious Zionism.
The History
A concise history is not only in order, but essential for understanding this issue. The proper starting point, however, is not Zionism, but the pre-Zionist Jewish communities and early settlement movements.
As explored briefly in a previous article, not only do the Haredi represent an unbroken line of traditional Judaism, they maintained a presence in Israel for 1900 years since the fall of the Kingdom of Israel, pioneered the return of long-standing displaced and exiled Jews to Israel for centuries, and were re-settling the land of Israel well before Zionism was even born as a movement. Unlike the Zionists, they did not view the creation of a sovereign state and standing army as the proper path forward, though they deeply valued the land and its resettlement through peaceful means. When Zionists embarked on their own project, they brought to the table grand visions of statehood along with larger organizational, diplomatic and funding efforts.
More importantly, in Herzl’s formulation, the Zionist project aimed to establish a secular state among the nations; a state modeled on European nation-states, except defined as Jewish and for Jewish nationalists. Towards this goal, they were notoriously selective in their efforts to import Jews of a certain type into Israel, exerted efforts to secularize some of the Jews that arrived in Israel, particularly Jews arriving from Eastern and Middle Eastern communities such as Yemen and Morocco, and re-labeled the existing settlements as the "Old Yishuv". This vision of a secular Western-style state clashed with the religious spirit of the existing settlements and communities. That tension lies at the root of many present-day disputes between segments of modern Israeli society and the Haredi world, even more than a century later. Haredi Jews were and are often unfairly seen as backwards, or are deemed too excessively 'ultra' for modern society.
As discussed in the earlier article, most Haredi Jews, despite their original opposition to the idea of a sovereign Jewish state, eventually adapted to its existence. It was a pragmatic adjustment, not an idealistic one. Most Haredim see the state as both a newcomer encroaching on their turf, as well as a new unavoidable reality that could perhaps be steered towards supporting traditional Judaism. Accordingly, they have tried to navigate this new framework without surrendering core principles. For many Haredim, the state was not a desired development but it eventually became a necessary one, particularly in light of the dangers Jews faced from hostile neighbors. Undermining the state would only cost lives at this late stage. Only certain extremist factions within the Haredi community continue to reject any cooperation with the state. Despite these adjustments, however, the underlying conflict of goals and values has not disappeared.
The question of Haredi conscription even preceded the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. From a secular perspective, obviously a universal army is seen as a life-or-death necessity for a fragile, tiny state surrounded by hostile neighbors. In contrast, for Haredi Jews, the foremost obligation is religious, including the critical ingredient of lifelong, daylong study of Torah. 'Torah' is not merely a collection of biblical texts or academic study, but a vast corpus of knowledge on the Jewish way of life that requires a lifetime of study. Furthermore, this study is commanded by God, and is regarded as essential for preserving the Jewish people. Haredim see it as the primary factor behind Jewish survival throughout history. The question is not whether an army is necessary, but one of priority. We will examine the specific arguments and debates behind this clash in the next section.
In 1948, this clash of ideals, combined with the reality of these communities living together in a tiny and precarious territory, led to consequences and decisions that may appear contradictory. On one hand, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founder and first prime minister, recognized that he needed a way for these communities to coexist. He could not establish a Jewish state if the centuries-old, existing religious communities refused to cooperate, living apart but within the fledgling state he envisioned. On the other hand, Ben-Gurion did not share the Haredi worldview and was committed to a secular state. He faced the challenge of finding a compromise that would allow the 'Jewish state' to function for all Jews, balancing his secular vision with the realities on the ground.
From this perspective, the constraints on the secular nature of the state were imposed by secular Zionists, not by religious authorities. Zionist leaders aimed to create a modern, national Jewish state, and in doing so they had to negotiate compromises that tempered their ideal secular society. For the Haredim, by contrast, isolationism was not merely an option, it was the preferred path, given the perceived spiritual and existential dangers posed by integration into a secular framework. This subtle point about the origins of religious restriction in the State of Israel is crucial and often overlooked.
Therefore, even before Israel’s official founding, Ben-Gurion implemented a special exemption for a group of approximately 400 yeshiva students. Some argue that this number effectively encompassed all existing yeshiva students at the time and was not intended as a strict quota. The exemption was initially applied under temporary military regulations rather than formal law, pending a more permanent legal framework. The agreement was signed by both parties just four days before the declaration of the state.
However, given the life-threatening circumstances of the war, many Haredim volunteered for military service and helped guard their settlements as a temporary measure. This ad-hoc participation, taking up arms to protect Jewish lives in a pragmatic way, would recur later in history, most recently after October 7, 2023. Some yeshiva students were also connected to the unofficial militias of the Irgun and Lehi, which operated largely independently of the Haganah, and in these cases they served fully in military operations.
This may seem like a contradiction but it is not, and must be carefully studied to understand where the core issue lies. Temporary service by individuals does not mean that Haredi leadership could morally sanction a broad law of conscription that would systematically undermine lifelong Torah study. Supporting the army in emergencies is very different from passing legislation that obligates all Haredi men to abandon full-time religious study. This is yet another subtle distinction that is lost in many articles.
Even during this early period of 1948-50, Haredim staged many street protests. However, as opposed to today's protests against conscription, these primarily protested the public desecration of the Sabbath.
In 1952, a new controversy emerged over the potential conscription of religious women. In an effort to address the issue, Ben-Gurion sought to meet with Haredi leaders, leading to the now-famous meeting with Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, known as the Hazon Ish. Much has been written about this encounter, and many accounts, on both sides, have added speculative or inaccurate details. The version presented here is based on the testimony of the only known witness present (Ben-Gurion’s secretary), who later spoke to the press. Notably, the conscription of women was not explicitly raised; the discussion focused on the broader question of cooperation between the two communities, with conscription hovering in the background.
During the meeting, the Rabbi invoked a traditional Jewish law: a camel on a narrow road carrying no load must give way and clear the path for a camel burdened with goods. He argued that the Haredim were "burdened" with religious obligations and millennia of tradition, while the incoming Zionists were "empty" and therefore should yield to and support the Haredi way of life. Ben-Gurion reportedly was disturbed by this, pointing out that the new settlers bore their own heavy responsibilities and were the ones providing protection for the Torah learners. The Rabbi countered that it was, in fact, the students who protected the soldiers, an opposite reality. According to the witness, Ben-Gurion was both shaken and impressed by the Rabbi’s demeanor and sharp mind. Ultimately, Ben-Gurion implemented the law regarding women's service, but never made it obligatory for religious women.
This pivotal meeting encapsulates the issues at the heart of the Haredi conscription issue. It demonstrates the viewpoint of a new community encroaching on the old, the perceived incompatibility between Haredi and Zionist worldviews, and the logical arguments each side has relied upon for decades, arguments that remain largely unchanged to this day.
What follows over the next 75 years is a long history of legal and political battles as both sides sought to either expand or reduce this exemption, but we will only include the significant highlights:
In 1954, an attempt was made to draft all religious individuals, including students after four years of study. The rabbis protested, and the effort was ultimately blocked.
In 1975, the quota was expanded from 400 to 800.
In 1977, the quota was abolished and the exemptions became unlimited. This change came as part of coalition negotiations with Haredi leaders, who made it a condition for government support. This basic reality has persisted since, though numerous limits and quotas have been introduced into law over the years, most of which failed to achieve their intended goals. While many religious individuals voluntarily join the army each year, Haredi leadership continues to resist these attempts to limit the exemptions for reasons that will be clarified below.
In 1988, after multiple petitions, the courts ruled that the issue fell outside the purview of the High Court of Justice and declined to intervene in government policy. This was probably the last time the court stepped away from the debate.
Ten years later, the same judge, Aharon Barak, participated in a Supreme Court ruling that effectively reversed the earlier decision, finding that the exemptions had no basis in statute and were therefore unlawful. This decision marked a turning point in the legal battle over conscription policy and set off a long series of legislative and judicial efforts to regulate the issue.
Since then, the issue has only grown as a political hot button and a go-to centerpiece of campaign rhetoric. Increasingly aggressive efforts to reduce or abolish the exemptions only made the Haredi dig in their heels and refuse to co-operate further, fueling unrest and aggressive protests in the streets. Every temporary law failed on both fronts to either effect lasting change, or to satisfy the anti-Haredi population.
The Arguments
The non-Haredi perspective is well understood, although it often hides ulterior motives which will be proven shortly. On the surface, the argument is straightforward: Israel needs as many soldiers as possible. The Haredi population is constantly growing, and not only does it not fulfill its duty of serving in the army and protecting its fellow citizens like everyone else, it is sitting studying books while the rest of the population is serving up its sons and daughters, some of whom are wounded or die in battle. Torah study, at best, is a nice-to-have cultural tradition, and, like academic studies, should not get in the way of army service. The Haredi population should postpone their studies or combine them with army service. Perhaps some exemplary students should receive exemptions much like exemplary academics or scientists, but this number should be small. At worst, Torah study is a waste of time.
In contrast, and as touched on earlier, from the Haredi point of view, Torah study is not comparable to academic studies, but is a critical aspect of life. Without it, not only does life have no meaning, but it is also what keeps Jews alive. It is Torah study that provides divine protection, gives the IDF its successes, and lowers mortality rates. It is Torah study that causes the constant flying rockets and missiles to miss as often as they do. Torah study does not preclude army service, but someone has to do it or else more soldiers will die. A certain percentage of the population must perform this critical job. Furthermore, the studies must be a lifelong dedication in order to fulfill religious requirements. This is the argument in a nutshell, but it requires a deeper dive in order to properly understand its implications.
Another key, often overlooked and underestimated issue is the secularizing agenda of the non-Haredi population. Efforts to integrate or modernize Haredim culturally and educationally are seen as additional deal-breaking obstacles, further blocking any attempt to mandate army service.
Each of these Haredi arguments will be examined in turn.
Split Reality
Naturally, a non-religious participant in these debates would dismiss the above Haredi claims as sheer nonsense, but that is not the point. We could also frame the debate more abstractly: In a democracy that allows for freedom of religion, the Haredi demands represent a fundamental religious need, without which the practice of religion cannot continue. However, even this does not get to the heart of the matter. The crux of the problem is that the two sides disagree on how reality functions, and it is a disagreement over matters of life and death. Both sides, however, aim to save lives and serve the needs of other civilians as best as possible. Heated accusations about failing to fulfill one's duty entirely miss this essential point.
Consider the following hypothetical debate between two statesmen: one argues that without intelligence agencies and spycraft, the military will fail or suffer many more deaths. The other believes, for some reason, that intelligence is overrated and that spies should be drafted into the army, handling their intelligence duties only in their spare time or after standard military service. The advocate for intelligence agencies sees his opponent not only as ignorant but dangerously so, endangering the population by promoting such a policy. This, in essence, is how the Haredi population views the secular perspective. Of course the army is important, but intelligence, or, in Haredi terms, Torah study, is even more critical, and a dedicated portion of the population should be allowed to practice it full-time, with full exemptions from standard army service. In addition, this job is equal to, or even more important than, army service, and replaces army service as their path to serve the nation.
Once this perspective is understood, the debate should take on a completely different tone and strategy. States routinely exempt certain professions from conscription, including doctors and policemen. Why, then, should spiritual protection be treated differently? If doctors were drafted, many lives would be lost. Torah study, argue the Haredi, is at the very least equivalent in importance.
Naturally, the debate would be very short because there is no common language or perspective between the sides, but it still is the real core issue and source of the disagreement. The accusation that Haredim do not want to contribute and serve the wider public is false as well as irrelevant.
Finally, the fact that government coalitions enact laws supporting Haredi claims should not be seen as a problem either. Every political party has goals and claims that other parties oppose; otherwise, they would not exist as separate entities. The purpose of a coalition is to find a compromise that allows each party to pursue its objectives according to its own perspective of reality. This happens all the time.
Imagine, for instance, if truck drivers formed a political party and argued that their profession is critical to the country, without which the nation would grind to a standstill. They might then claim that the state should exempt them from army service. One could logically argue for or against this claim, but if the rest of the coalition cannot convince the truck drivers to drop it, it would be standard practice to reach a compromise and grant them some form of exemption. This is neither illegal nor discriminatory; it is simply a disagreement over how best to serve and protect society. Governments are built through such compromises.
Forced Reality
The second core problem is a widespread secularization and integration agenda. Using real-life examples and evidence, we will demonstrate and prove that this not only exists but is widespread. We will also explain why this is a separate critical issue that further blocks all attempts at Haredi conscription even if the previously described problem of clashing realities did not exist.
The Haredi lifestyle is highly demanding and strict, affecting every aspect of daily life. Some requirements are minor, many are important, and some are considered so critical that imprisonment, or even death, would be seen as preferable to violating them. For a rabbi to advise a religious individual to enter the army, these critical spiritual dangers must not be present. For example, living in a co-ed camp environment with constant sexual temptation would be regarded as a serious deal breaker. The issue of conscription becomes even more sensitive when guidance must be given to all religious men collectively, or when a proposed law threatens the religious future of the broader community. These religious concerns are separate from, and in addition to, the Torah-study issue discussed in the previous section.
The goal of an Orthodox religious man who joins the military is to leave the army as religious as when he entered. Therefore, conditions must exist to make this possible. This goes beyond merely providing kosher food; it also includes gender-segregated army camps, commanders who respect religious limitations and do not order soldiers to perform acts that contradict their faith without compelling or life-threatening reasons, and access to rabbinic guidance at every turn to answer practical questions, among other requirements.
A spiritually strong individual could, in theory, join the army and attempt to navigate its spiritual dangers to emerge unscathed, and might even succeed. But a rabbi could not, in good conscience, advise him to take such a risk. In all probability, the soldier would be placed in military jail for sticking to his principles and ignoring orders. This is unworkable, especially when taking into account that this would be repeated thousands of times by all Haredi conscripts.
In Israel, religious-friendly army units have been established to attempt these goals. Even so, these units face numerous obstacles, including forced integration, secularizing pressures from commanders, and active sabotage that undermines the carefully structured religious environment around these units.
One classic and notorious example is also one of the most compelling, precisely because it is so banal. Its banality clearly points to ulterior motives: In Judaism, a man is forbidden from hearing a woman sing. It is not forbidden for women to sing, but men should not be present when they do. For Haredim, this is a serious issue. For the army, it is obviously a non-essential part of military service. As part of army life, soldiers participate in ceremonies where women sing. Religious soldiers have repeatedly requested exemptions from these ceremonies, and their requests were denied. Even when the army established a committee to review the issue, the decision at the highest level remained a refusal. One army rabbi resigned over this matter, and other rabbis responded by stating that they would stop recommending religious men to enlist. But the pinnacle of this absurd story occurred when some religious soldiers proposed a very reasonable compromise: They asked to be allowed to wear earplugs during the ceremony. Even this was refused. Obviously, there is no other explanation for such repeated refusals across the board and for such a banal request for a non-essential part of army service, unless they have a secularization agenda.
The above case is only the tip of the iceberg. Gender-segregated religious soldiers were sent to co-ed courses and made to clean female camp bathrooms as part of tactics to bypass their segregated environment. In this more recent interview, a rabbi and founder of a religious army unit, a man strongly supportive of Haredi enlistment, described systematic efforts to force integration of religious soldiers with female soldiers and to undermine the carefully constructed religious framework.
This report by a Haredi father who wanted his son to enlist tells of systematic efforts by the commanders to deny his son basic religious rights. These include cancelling prayer time, forcing soldiers to desecrate the Sabbath for non-essential activities, shoving food in their faces during the Yom Kippur fast, installing a TV in their room, and so on. As a result, the father changed his approach and sought an exemption for his next son.
This recent investigative report describes systematic and gradual changes to the very contracts and terms of the religious army units. The army systematically sabotaged the very framework that was carefully set up for religious soldiers. Parallel units were created without rabbinical supervision, with the goal of drawing soldiers into non-religious units bearing a religious label. The original religious unit's contract was altered in 30 places to undermine its religious character. The authority of the unit’s rabbi was curtailed in many ways, rabbis were replaced by military commanders, the rabbi’s right to select or veto candidates was removed, and even the right to a religious-friendly, gender-segregated ceremony was eliminated. Is it any wonder that Haredi enlistment has plummeted since the unit’s establishment?
Another area that proves this secularization agenda is the topic of enlistment quotas and how the government counts religious soldiers. Since 2013, the Israeli government enacted laws for Haredi enlistment quotas or targets, and concomitant with these laws, bureaucratic methods were established to determine what qualifies as a Haredi enlistment. Naturally, these criteria changed over time, with both sides pushing and negotiating for stricter or looser counts, respectively. For example, a key criterion is whether the soldier studied in a Haredi school. The law originally required two years of study, though Haredim argued for one year. The student’s age is also significant: only time studied as a teenager counts, not years studied at a younger age. Similarly, the government only recognized approved Haredi schools, excluding soldiers from unrecognized schools in the final count. In 2020, the government cracked down on lenient counting methods, making the qualifying criteria stricter.
Stepping back from this bureaucratic swamp, it becomes clear that the whole approach is fundamentally misguided, and, in fact, proves a secularization agenda. Consider the following argument: if the goal is to have the Haredi population contribute to society through army enlistment, why should it matter whether the son is still fully religious when he joins? It should suffice that his roots are a Haredi family. Even if the soldier lost his religion as a young teenager, he should still count as a Haredi soldier, because the demand pertains to social groups, not individual religious observance. The same issue arises when the government discounts soldiers based on incomplete lists of schools, or based on whether they studied for one year or two.
The fact that the government only counts soldiers who are religious at the time of enlistment proves that their target is religion itself, not the Haredi community. A son of Haredi parents who has lost his faith does not count as a 'win' in their view. Quod erat demonstrandum.
Finally, the fact that they don't make the same fuss over secular draft evaders in Tel Aviv proves this point from yet another angle. The number of non-Haredi draft evaders is said to be equal to the official number of Haredi draft evaders.
Putting all this together, it is no surprise that even Haredi individuals who are pro-enlistment may change their minds over the years. Rabbis, especially, cannot reasonably be expected to change their minds while the army systematically undermines the religiosity of religious soldiers at every turn. As explained, some of these issues would even compel a Haredi to choose prison, or, in extreme cases, death, rather than enlist.
The painful truth is that these problems should not exist at all. The army could function just as effectively without these persistent efforts to undermine religion. Religious units have been established and have proven their effectiveness, and they worked well for a time, until the army sabotaged them.
The Religious Zionist Argument
The Religious-Zionist population seemingly presents a different and compelling argument against the Haredi position on conscription, one grounded in Judaism itself: Even in the Torah and in the ancient Kingdom of Israel, rabbis, leaders, and Torah scholars all served as soldiers and fought in wars regularly. In addition, although Torah study was widespread, military service was clearly considered necessary.
However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny, and both of the core problems and Haredi arguments outlined above remain.
Regarding Torah study: In Biblical times, a segment of the population always studied, even if that study had to occur between battles or while in the field. Today, by contrast, the army conscripts all young men for three full years and provides little time for prayer, let alone deep study.
As noted earlier, the Haredi do not claim that an army is unnecessary, but rather that Torah study is even more critical, and that a dedicated portion of the population must perform this essential task. Given the difficulty and scope of this responsibility, and the distractions of the modern world, it must be carried out by students in a strict, immersive environment. If all of Israel were Haredi, they would almost certainly develop their own system for conscripting soldiers for a functional army while prioritizing Torah study.
Regarding the secularization agenda discussed in the “Forced Reality” section, the Religious-Zionist argument does not address this issue at all. Either the Religious-Zionist military frameworks allow their members more freedom to practice religion, or they are simply less strict than the Haredim. One of these conclusions must be true, given the extensive evidence of systematic sabotage. Then again, there have been complaints even from some Religious-Zionist soldiers about the IDF getting in their way with secularization agendas.
The Haredi counter-argument points out that during Biblical times, the army was inherently religious: soldiers were religious, and rabbis and prophets led these soldiers and made decisions based on Torah principles rather than Western values. And, obviously, military service did not aim to undermine religious practice as the IDF does.
Furthermore, the decision to go to war was made by a religious king or by the council of seventy rabbis (the Sanhedrin), not by secular leaders. Similarly, the laws governing warfare were based on Torah principles, not secular international law, which could conflict with religious values.
A Potential Solution
A solution for this morass could exist in theory, but would require nothing short of a revolution in thinking, primarily on the part of the non-Haredi population. Frankly, this doesn't seem likely, but here is the solution nevertheless:
First, the IDF, the government, and society at large must not only correct the attitude documented in the "Forced Reality" section and stop undermining religion at every turn, but must also set up a framework where complaints and violations are addressed immediately. There is no justification for demanding Haredi enlistment while simultaneously sabotaging their faith. The army can accommodate Haredi requirements and still operate effectively; the success of existing religious units proves this beyond doubt. It is only the bias, the secular arrogance, and the anti-religious sentiments of some in society that have made it unworkable. Before ideology can be tackled, the pragmatic groundwork must be firmly established.
Next, the state and population must accept that there are red lines that the Haredi leaders will never cross, even if it leads to extreme outcomes such as mass imprisonment or mass emigration. This is not obstinacy, it is principle.
One insight to keep in mind is that there is a difference between individual Haredim who choose to enlist, and rabbis who would be asked to issue a general command for enlistment. Society can appeal to the former without expecting the latter.
Next, to address the ideological issue of Torah learning and give the rabbis something to work with, the state must drop its approach of quotas and rigid targets. Even with quotas, the secular crowd is never satisfied and is constantly pushing for higher numbers. From a religious perspective, it should not be about numbers, but about quality and about retaining all students that have dedicated their life to Torah study. However, there is room to compromise regarding partial drop-outs or students unable to handle full yeshiva life. The numbers of these students are far from trivial.
As explained earlier, the state's approach to counting Haredi enlistments is fundamentally flawed. If every soldier from a Haredi family were counted—regardless of how many years he studied, whether he attended an approved school, or his current level of religiosity—the numbers would likely show that enlistment has always been higher than claimed.
One potential approach towards a solution is to grant exemptions strictly for full-time students. This could even create an incentive: Rabbis could use this to encourage students to become more disciplined and dedicated in their studies. Thus, enforcement could possibly work hand-in-hand with rabbis, reporting those who fail to meet their obligations.
Currently, even with partial drop-outs, rabbis would prefer that they avoid the army where spiritual dangers are greater. Therefore the key to meaningful change is ensuring that the army supports religious soldiers so that they leave as religious as when they entered. If such a framework is implemented, not only would Haredi enlistment increase, but rabbis could even recommend that drop-outs enlist on a case-by-case basis.
Why might this work? Because in a properly structured system, a strict, rabbi-supervised army unit becomes a safer, more controlled environment than a partial yeshiva drop-out wandering the streets, where the risk of losing faith is higher. This single factor, creating a secure, religiously safe military framework, could make all the difference, giving rabbis the safe option to recommend enlistment where it was previously unthinkable.
However, as long as the non-Haredi population focuses on attacking religion itself rather than understanding and accommodating the unique needs of the Haredi community, any attempt at reform will be doomed before it begins.
Closing Thoughts
The separation of religion and state cannot always succeed, simply because disagreements exist over how reality itself functions. These disagreements create unbridgeable gaps, some of them tied to issues so critical, they affect survival. While such disagreements may exist between any two opposing parties, this problem is much more acute and common where religion is involved since religion often maintains a very different worldview.
The issue of Haredi conscription is a striking and deeply instructive example of this clash. This article has pinpointed the unbridgeable gap and traced why this problem has persisted for 80 years.
As the political left continues to drift further into progressive territory, distancing itself from its more conservative roots, these tensions are only likely to worsen.
Yet there remains a glimmer of hope. If the left can at least return to the liberal principles of tolerance, tolerance even toward closed or insular religious systems, and prioritize freedom over imposing their ideology on others, there is still room to make coexistence work.